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MEDICAL LAW - UNMEDICATED DEFENDANTS: THE Two­
PRONGED DILEMMA - Commonwealth v. Louraine, 390 Mass. 28, 
453 N.E.2d 437 (1983). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On August 23, 1983, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts 
held in Commonwealth v. Louraine 1 that a mentally ill defendant, who 
had raised an insanity defense at his trial for murder, could refuse the 
State's forcible administration of antipsychotic drugs. 2 The court con­
cluded that defendants' right to place before the jury their version of 
the facts, including their natural demeanor, inhered in the right to a 
fair trial. 3 The ruling by the motion judge precluding Louraine the 
opportunity to be unmedicated at trial, therefore, constituted revers­
ible error because it violated sixth and fourteenth amendment protec­
tions. 4 Since Louraine's mental functioning was at issue, the 
Commonwealth should not have forcibly administered antipsychotic 
drugs, which visibly affected the defendant's demeanor and mental 
processes. 5 
With its holding, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts 
expanded the scope of constitutional protections applicable to defend­
ants who raise the insanity defense. Although Louraine appealed his 
conviction on various grounds,6 this note will focus on the involun­
1. 390 Mass. 28,453 N.E.2d 437 (1983). 
2. [d. at 34-37, 453 N.E.2d at 442-44. 
3. [d. at 34, 453 N.E.2d at 442. 
4. [d. at 33-38, 453 N.E.2d at 441-44. The Louraine court also stated that the right is 
guaranteed not only by the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitu­
tion but also by Article 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. Article 12 provides 
that 'every subject shall have a right to produce all proofs, that may be favorable to him.' 
[d. at 34, 453 N.E.2d at 442. 
5. [d. at 32-33, 453 N.E.2d at 441. State medical personnel characterized Louraine as 
suffering from chronic paranoid schizophrenia. [d. at 32, 453 N.E.2d at 441. The doses of 
antipsychotic medication were described as "heavy" and were continued throughout the 
time of trial. [d. at 33, 453 N.E.2d at 441. The superior court judge found that the medica­
tion reduced Louraine's alertness and ability to concentrate although it did help control the 
psychotic episodes that Louraine experienced. !d. 
6. [d. at 29, 453 N.E.2d at 439. The defense primarily claimed error on four grounds: 
First, the ruling of the motion judge deprived defendant of an opportunity to present to the 
jury his demeanor in an unmedicated condition; second, the trial judge failed to take appro­
priate steps during the trial to determine the defendant's continued competency; third, the 
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tary medication issue. It will explore the potential difficulties for the 
mentally ill defendant who refuses antipsychotic medication 7 in order 
to present a true demeanor at trial but who as a result may be ren­
dered incompetent to comprehend the trial proceedings. Louraine re­
flects legitimate legal concerns. It does not, however, resolve the 
dilemma it creates for a defendant who may have to chose one consti­
tutional protection at the expense of another. 
II. SOURCES AND MEANING OF THE LOURAINE DECISION 
On May 26, 1979, two police officers responded to a call from 23­
B Van Buren Avenue in Springfield, Massachusetts. Upon arriving, 
they found Albert Zulucki dead from multiple stab wounds. 8 Peter 
Louraine appeared at the top of the stairs and stated, "I called the 
police, I stabbed him."9 Louraine did not contest the facts of the homi­
cide at his subsequent trial but instead relied on the defense of lack of 
criminal responsibility.lO Due to Louraine's long history of psychotic 
disorders and drug abuse, the Commonwealth did not dispute 
Louraine's contention that he suffered from paranoid schizophrenia at 
trial judge instructed the jury incorrectly; and last, the trial judge did not appropriately 
address the voluntariness of specific statements made by the defendant after the crime. Id. 
7. Antipsychotic medication is the generic term for drugs which mitigate the symp­
toms of psychotic disorders. It is the most accurate term used although they have also been 
referred to as psychotropics, neuroleptics and major tranquilizers. The term 'psychotropics' 
usually refers to all mind-altering drugs. Presently the medical community considers the 
administration of antipsychotic drugs, commonly known as thorazine, prolixin, haldol, 
stelazine and navane, as the most efficacious means available for treatment of acute psycho­
sis. Psychosis is a descriptive term denoting a patient's withdrawal from reality or an at­
tempt to reconcile reality with a severely disorganized thinking process. Though not a cure 
for psychotic disorders, these drugs do facilitate control of psychotic symptoms such as 
hallucinations (hearing or seeing things not in reality); delusions (irrational and unrealistic 
perception of reality); and paranoia (unrealistic suspicions or fear). See K. BERNHEIM & R. 
LEWINE, SCHIZOPHREHIA: SYMPTOMS, CAUSES,· TREATMENTS 123 (1979); 
Cole,Pharmacotherapy of Psychosis, in PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY IN THE PRACTICE OF 
MEDICINE (M. Jarvik ed. 1977); Grinker, Neurosis. Psychosis. and Borderline States, in 
COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRy/II 415 (A. Freedman, H. Kaplan & B. Sad­
dock 2d ed. 1976). 
8. Louraine, 390 Mass. at 29, 453 N.E.2d at 439. 
9. Id. 
10. Id. at 30, 453 N.E. 2d at 440. Commonwealth v. McHoul, 352 Mass. 544, 549­
53, 226 N.E.2d 556, 559-62 (1967), established the Massachusetts standard for lack of 
criminal responsibility. The rule reflects the approach codified in the American Law Insti­
tute Model Penal Code Proposed Official Draft: 
Section 4.01: Mental Disease or Defect Excluding Responsibility (I): A person is 
not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of 
mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity to either appreciate the 
criminality of his conduct or conform his conduct to the requirements of law. 
MODEL PENAL CODE SEC. 4.01 (PROPOSED OFFICIAL DRAFT 1962). 
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the time of the crime. Instead, the prosecution questioned the degree 
of his illness. liOn a pretrial motion, the defendant requested that if he 
were found competent that he be permitted to attend trial in an un­
medicated state. Louraine had not been taking medication at the time 
of the homocide. 12 The motion judge denied the motion on the 
grounds that the "defendant's behavior and his symptoms of mental 
illness, were being controlled to some extent by medication."13 At a 
competency hearing held later, the trial judge concurred that the med­
ication, while not eliminating the psychotic episodes, did enable the 
defendant to "better control himself and to cope with these epi­
sodes."14 The motion judge agreed that medication was alleviating 
Louraine's mental symptoms and ruled that in order to present an in­
sanity defense the defendant need not attend trial in an un medicated 
condition. The judge reasoned that medical experts could explain to 
the jury whatever effects the medication had on the defendant's behav­
ior. 15 Louraine, therefore, remained on antipsychotic drugs during the 
II. Louraine, 390 Mass. at 30, 453 N.E.2d at 440. The State conceded that Peter 
Louraine suffered from mental illness from the age of sixteen. Id. at 36 n.9, 453 N.E.2d at 
442 n.9. Testimony from Louraine's brother, Phillip, other relatives and health care profes­
sionals confirmed that the defendant experienced hallucinations, had been committed to 
mental hospitals, had a history of ingesting drugs (including marihuana, lysergic acid 
diethylamide and mescaline) and had acted in a strange and violent manner including sev­
eral suicide attempts. Id. at 30-32, 453 N.E.2d at 440-41. For more information on 
psychotic disorders see generally, Grinker, Neurosis, Psychosis, and Borderline States in 
COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRy/II 415 (A. Freedman, H. Kaplan and B. 
Saddock 2d ed. 1976); CHAPMAN, TEXTBOOK OF CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY (2d ed. 1976). 
12. Louraine, 390 Mass. at 31-32, 453 N.E.2d at 441. When a defendant is taking 
antipsychotic medication at anytime before committing a crime the importance of present­
ing an unmedicated demeanor to the jury would not be as relevant. See State of N. H. v. 
Hayes, 118 N.H. 458, 389 A.2d 1379 (1978) The court in Hayes held that the jury should 
view the defendant without medication for as long as he was found to have been without 
medication at the time of the crime. In Hayes, the defendant ceased taking medication only 
one day before committing the crime. Id. at 462, 389 A.2d at 1382. 
13. Louraine, 390 Mass. at 32-33, 453 N.E.2d at 441. The judge found that without 
medication Louraine would not be competent to stand trial. Id. at 33, 453 N.E.2d at 441. 
14. Id. at 33, 453 N.E.2d at 441. The defendant did not renew his motion to be 
unmedicated when before the trial judge. At the pretrial motion hearing, however, he had 
requested that he be unmedicated for the competency hearing. The court denied his re­
quest. Id. Testimony at both hearings confirmed that the state was administering heavy 
dosages of antipsychotic medications to Louraine. prolixin, thorazine, melaril, stelazine 
and trilafon were among the anti psychotics administered. Elavil and artane, which are not 
antipsychotic medications, were also administered. Id. at 32-33 n.5, 453 N.E.2d at 441 n.5. 
15. Id. at 33 n.7, 453 N.E.2d at 441 n.7. Although expert medical testimony was 
presented at the pretrial hearings, no medical testimony was presented during the trial. The 
supreme judicial court later held that even if such testimony had been offered, it would only 
have mitigated the unfair prejudice arising from the medication affecting the defendant's 
demeanor. The court concluded, therefore, that such expert testimony did not adequately 
compensate for the potential injury to the defendant's case.ld. at 33-35, 453 N.E.2d at 442. 
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trial. 
The jury convicted Louraine of murder in the first degree and the 
judge sentenced him to a term of life imprisonment. 16 Louraine ap­
pealed the conviction on the grounds, inter alia, that his constitutional 
rights to a fair trial had been violated. 17 The Supreme Judicial Court 
of Massachusetts reversed the judgment of conviction and held that 
the lack of opportunity to present an unmedicated demeanor at trial 
constituted a violation of the sixth and fourteenth amendments. IS 
The rights protected by the sixth amendment encompass 
whatever is "fundamental and essential to a fair trial."19 The court in 
Louraine affirmed the legal principle that the accused always retains 
the right to present his/her version of the facts.20 Additionally, when 
the defendant's sanity at the time of the crime is in question, an ele­
ment which must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, "all conduct 
which is at all probative of his mental condition"21 is admissible in 
evidence. Citing to numerous sources for support, the Louraine court 
emphasized the universally accepted rule that in insanity defense 
cases, a defendant's demeanor in the courtroom can always be consid­
ered by the jury.22 A problem arises when the State forcibly adminis­
ters medication, albeit for medical reasons, which significantly alters 
the defendant's outward appearance, thereby affecting defendant's in­
sanity defense. The supreme judicial court reasoned that expert testi­
mony describing the effect of the medication on the defendant did not 
suffice to remedy the potential prejudicial impact to his case.23 
16. Id. at 29, 453 N.E.2d at 439. 
17. See supra note 6. 
18. Louraine, 390 Mass. at 29, 453 N.E.2d at 439. 
19. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963). 
20. Louraine, 390 Mass. at 33,453 N.E.2d at 441 (citing Washington v. Texas, 388 
U.S. 14, 19 (1967)). 
21. Louraine, 390 Mass. at 34, 453 N.E.2d at 442 (citing United States v. Hartfield, 
513 F.2d 254, 259-60 (9th Cir. 1975)). The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts re­
tains a permissive interpretation of evidence rules in insanity cases, as shown by Common­
wealth v. Schulze, 389 Mass. 735, 452 N.E.2d 216 (1983). There the court created a new 
rule to allow the testimony of a defendant's condition from a general practitioner who had 
examined the him prior to the crime. The court stated that when criminal responsibility is 
at issue, the importance of presenting a defendant's entire medical history, conduct, and 
appearance to the jury warrants the admission of a general practitioner's observation. Id. 
at 740, 452 N.E.2d at 220. Prior Massachusetts' law limited such testimony to specialists. 
Id. 
22. Louraine, 390 Mass. at 35, 453 N.E.2d at 442 (citing Commonwealth v. Dever­
eaux, 257 Mass. 391, 395, 153 N.E. 881, 882 (1926); United States v. Chandler, 72 F. Supp. 
230,238 (D.Mass. 1947); In re Pray, 133 Vt. 253, 257-58, 336 A.2d 174, 177 (1975); State 
v. Maryott, 6 Wash. App. 96, 101,492 P.2d 239, 242 (1971); State v. Hayes, 118 N.H. 458, 
462,389 A.2d 1379, 1381-82 (1978). 
23. The court expressed concern for the inappropriateness of a state's intrusion into 
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Additional support for expanding the scope of admissible evi­
dence when insanity is at issue is found within the Model Penal Code 
definition of criminal responsibility. Massachusetts law follows this 
standard. The Model Penal Code test warrants consideration of a wide 
range of evidence, including a defendant's courtroom demeanor.24 To 
buttress the argument against State intrusion in the defendant's factual 
case, the supreme judicial court emphasized the jury's role in assessing 
the evidence. Broad discretion has always been afforded the jury to 
evaluate the facts presented on the insanity issue.25 However, inherent 
in this principle of broad discretion is the assumption that the defend­
ant has been given a full and fair opportunity to present his version of 
the facts.26 The pivotal question facing the Louraine court, therefore, 
was whether precluding a defendant the chance to present an unmedi­
cated demeanor to the jury impermissibly interfered with a defend­
ant's right to a fair trial. Previously, other jurisdictions addressed this 
exact question. The Louraine court referred to these opinions for gui­
dance.27 In the 1975 Vermont case of In re Pray,28 the mentally ill 
defendant was heavily medicated during the trial. The Vermont 
Supreme Court held that because the jury never saw him in an un­
drugged state his conviction should be reversed. 
defendants' freedom to control their own defense. By administering drugs to the defend­
ants, the State would in essence manipulate what the jury would see and, therefore, would 
emasculate the jury's power to evaluate the facts. Louraine, 390 Mass. at 35, 453 N.E.2d at 
442. See State v. Maryott, 6 Wash. App. 96, 102,492 P.2d 239, 242 (1971). 
24. Louraine, 390 Mass. at 37 n.ll, 453 N.E.2d at 444 n.ll. Commonwealth v. 
McHoul, 352 Mass. 544,226 N.E.2d 556 (1967) set forth the Massachusetts standard for 
criminal responsibility as well as outlining the applicable evidential approach. McHoul, 
352 Mass. at 550-51, 226 N.E.2d at 560. The Louraine court distinguished a 1978 South 
Carolina case, State v. Law, 270 S.c. 664, 244 S.E.2d 302 (1978). In Law, the court held 
that administration of psychotropic medication did not undermine the insanity defense. 
Law, 270 S.c. at 672-74, 244 S.E.2d at 306-07. South Carolina law, however, judges in­
sanity by the M'Naughten test which weighs the defendant's ability to distinguish right 
from wrong. Id. at 669, 244 S.E.2d at 304. Massachusetts follows a test reflecting the much 
broader Model Penal Code approach and allows a wide range of evidence on the insanity 
issue. Louraine, 390 Mass. at 37 n.ll, 453 N.E.2d at 444 n.ll. 
25. Louraine, 390 Mass. at 35, 453 N.E.2d at 442-43. The Louraine court cited to 
examples where broad discretion is granted to juries in evaluating the insanity defense, 
such as: a jury may infer that a defendant is sane based upon its members' own common 
experiences that a great majority of people are sane and that any particular person is sane; 
and that expert testimony is not necessary to prove a defendant sane beyond a reasonable 
doubt even if uncontroverted expert testimony is presented that a defendant is insane. Id. 
at 35-36, 453 N.E.2d at 443. 
26. Id. at 36, 453 N.E.2d at 443. 
27. See supra note 22. 
28. Louraine, 390 Mass. at 37, 453 N.E.2d at 443 (citing In re Pray, 133 Vt. 253, 336 
A.2d 174 (1975). 
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[a]t the very least [the jury] should have been informed that he [de­
fendant Pray] was under heavy, sedative medication, that his behav­
ior in their presence was strongly conditioned by drugs 
administered to him at the direction of the State, and that his de­
fense of insanity was to be applied to a basic behavior pattern that 
was not the one they were observing. In fact, it may well have been 
necessary, in view of the critical nature of the issue, to expose the 
jury to the undrugged, unsedated Gary Pray, at least, insofar as the 
safety and trial progress might permit. 29 
The issue was not how beneficial the medication was to the de­
fendant, but whether the outward behavior of the heavily sedated Pray 
prejudiced the jury's evaluation of his sanity. 30 The focus on the legal 
concerns to the exclusion of the medical questions parallel the ap­
proach taken by the Louraine court. State v. Maryott 31 represents an­
other case where a court stressed protection of a defendant's sixth 
amendment rights. The Louraine court cited to the Maryott opinion 
which argued the State's forcible administration of drugs constituted a 
serious intrusion into a person's liberty and privacy interests. 
[i]f the state may administer tranquilizers to a defendant who ob­
jects, the state is, in effect, permitted to determine what the jury will 
see or not see of the defendant's case by medically altering the atti­
tude, appearance and demeanor of the defendant, when they are 
relevant to the jury's consideration of his mental condition.32 
In Maryott, where the defendant was administered heavy tranquilizers 
to control his violent behavior, the court strongly averred that a de­
fendant must be free from restraints which affect reason. 33 
The New Hampshire court in State v. Hayes34 definitively out­
lined the conditions by which the State could forcibly administer an­
tipsychotics in the courtroom setting. Though applying a balancing 
approach on the right to be unmedicated, the Hayes opinion in general 
supported the Louraine court's reasoning. The facts of the Hayes case 
revealed that the defendant had refrained from taking his anti­
29. Louraine, 390 Mass. at 37, 453 N.E.2d at 443-44 (quoting In re Pray, 133 Vt. at 
257-58, 336 A.2d at 177). 
30. In re Pray, 133 Vt. at 256-57,336 A.2d at 176-77. The defense counsel expressed 
fear that without medication, which was in heavy frequent doses, the defendant's behavior 
might result in exclusion from the courtroom. Id. at 256, 336 A.2d at 176-77. 
31. 6 Wash. App. 96, 492 P.2d 239 (1971). 
32. Louraine, 390 Mass. at 35, 453 N.E.2d at 442 (quoting State v. Maryott, 6 Wash. 
App. 96, 102,492 P.2d 239, 242 (1971». . 
33. Maryott, 6 Wash. App. at 100, 492 P.2d at 241-42. 
34. 118 N.H. 458, 389 A.2d 1379 (1978). 
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psychotic medication only one day before he committed a murder. 3s 
The New Hampshire court held that he may be compelled to receive 
medication only 
if the jury is instructed about the facts relating to the defendant's 
use of medication and if at some time during the trial, assuming the 
defendant so requests, the jury views him without medication for as 
long as he is found to have been without medication at the time of 
the crime.36 
In contrast to the approach of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massa­
chusetts, the New Hampshire court evaluated the defendant's need for 
antipsychotic drugs and deferred the final decision, which should re­
fiect the legal and medical concerns, to the trial judge's discretion.37 
In addition, the Hayes court distinguished the Maryott case on the 
facts that Maryott was administered tranquilizers that were intended 
to control him rather than alleviate psychotic symptoms. 38 Louraine 
refers to portions of the Hayes opinion which refer to the evidentiary 
justification supporting the defendant's right to offer his demeanor in 
an unmedicated state. No mention was made of the potential thera­
peutic value for forcing antipsychotic medication.39 The only sugges­
tion in the Louraine decision that other factors may be considered was 
the court's caution that each case must be decided on its own facts.40 
The analysis of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in 
Louraine supported by persuasive authority irrefutably underscored a 
defendant's right to a fair trial. In this case the opportunity to present 
an unmedicated demeanor to the jury was considered an essential 
component of a fair trial. When a schizophrenic defendant is taken off 
35. Id. at 460, 389 A.2d at 1380. 
36. Id. at 462,389 A.2d at 1381-82; See Louraine, 390 Mass. at 36-37, 453 N.E.2d at 
444. 
37. Hayes, 118 N.H. at 462-63, 389 A.2d at 1382. 
38. Id. at 461,389 A.2d at 1381. See Maryott, 6 Wash. App. at 97, 492 P.2d at 240. 
39. Louraine, 390 Mass. at 34, 36 at 37, 453 N.E.2d at 442-43. 
40. Louraine, 390 Mass at 37, 453 N.E.2d at 444. The supreme judicial court clearly 
stated that it was not suggesting that a new trial must be granted where the defendant's 
appearance is marred by some emotional or physical impairment regardless of its nature or 
how it was brought about. Id. In Commonwealth v. Lombardi, 378 Mass. 612, 616, 393 
N.E.2d 346, 349 (1979), the supreme judicial court considered whether a defendant with 
amnesia could receive a fair trial. In Lombardi, factors such as the nature of the crime, the 
extent to which the prosecution made full disclosures, the likelihood that a defense could be 
established but for the amnesia and the extent and effect of the amnesia were all relevant 
considerations. Id. Similar factors should be applied to cases involving incompetency and 
insanity. However, the court went on to distinquish amnesia from insanity cases. The key 
factor distinguishing the two situations is that in Louraine type cases the Commonwealth is 
taking affirmative steps to bring the defendant to trial in an altered state. Louraine, 390 
Mass. at 38 n.12, 453 N.E.2d at 444 n.12. 
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medication, however, it is likely that psychotic symptoms will resur­
face. The Louraine opinion does not address the potential medical and 
legal dilemmas which face a defendant who attempts to exercise the 
rights outlined in the Louraine holding. In the remainder of this case­
note, the consequences of applying the Louraine decision are 
discussed. 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Applying the Louraine Decision 
It is now uncontroverted that in Massachusetts, when insanity is 
raised as an issue, a defendant has a right to appear before the jury in 
an unmedicated condition if he/she was unmedicated at the time of 
the crime. Without medication, however, psychotic symptoms will re­
turn. Since the ramifications of refusing medication may be a deterio­
ration of the defendant's cognitive functioning, it is likely that he/she 
will become incompetent to stand trial. A decision to be unmedicated 
may be a decision to become incompetent. This potentiality then cre­
ates a dilemma for the defendant with a psychotic disorder which lim­
its the beneficial impact of the Louraine holding. 
In Louraine, the court did not address the issue of competency, 
because it had not been raised on appeal.41 Further judicial guidance is 
necessary to apply meaningfully the rights acknowledged in Louraine. 
In footnote 13 the court foreshadowed a possible approach: 
We agree, however, with the New Hampshire Supreme Court that if 
a defendant wishes to appear at trial in an unmedicated condition, 
even though medication may be necessary to maintain his mental 
competency he may be held to have waived his right to be tried 
while competent.42 
In support of this reasoning, the New Hampshire Supreme Court, in 
State v. Hayes,43 has stated that when competency may be waived, it is 
imperative that the judge be sure that the defendant, while competent, 
understands: (1) that he/she has a constitutional right not to be tried 
while legally incompetent: (2) that if he/she refuses medication he/ 
she may become incompetent; and (3) that he/she voluntarily gives up 
this right if he/she requests to appear at trial unmedicated.44 It is 
41. Louraine, 390 Mass. at 38 n.l3, 453 N.E.2d at 444 n.l3. 
42. Id. 
43. 118 N.H. 458, 389 A.2d 1379 (1978). 
44. Id. at 462-63,389 A.2d at 1381-82; see also Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970); 
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questionable whether there has been a voluntary waiver, when the 
choice is mandated only for defendants who have psychotic disorders. 
When dealing with defendants with psychotic disorders both 
competency and voluntariness issues become of paramount concern. 
The symptoms of schizophrenia include disordered thought patterns, 
inappropriate affect, ambivalence, autism, hallucinations and delu­
sions.45 These characteristics would predictably interfere with a per­
sons ability to make rational, productive decisions. In a legal context, 
however, the current view is that an individual must be adjudged in­
competent through a due process proceeding.46 Even though the de­
fendant has been institutionalized, an automatic presumption of 
incompetency does not arise.47 The standard applied in the courtroom 
setting is that a person is competent to stand trial if he/she properly 
understands the nature of the proceedings against him/her and is ca­
pable of rationally assisting and conferring with legal counse1.48 This 
test for competency protects a defendant's sixth amendment rights.49 
When a schizophrenic defendant chooses to be un medicated, he/she 
may become by definition legally incompetent. Experts testifying at 
Peter Louraine's competency hearing unanimously agreed that 
Louraine would not be competent to stand trial if he were unmedi­
cated.50 When the judicial system offers defendants without psychotic 
disorders the full panoply of sixth amendment protections, how can 
there be a justification for forcing a mentally ill defendant to choose 
one protection to the exclusion of another? 
In addition to affecting competency, the decision to remain un­
medicated may also interfere with defendants' ability to control physi-
State v. Maryott, 6 Wash. App. 96, 492 P.2d 238 (1971); Winick, Psychotropic Medication 
and Competence to Stand Trial, 1977 AM. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 769, 797. 
45. See generally Lehmann, R., Schizophrenia; Clinical Features, COMPREHENSIVE 
TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY II (Freedman, A., Kaplan, H., Sadock B. eds. 1975) ; Appel­
baum, Gutheil, Rotting with Their Rights On: Constitutional Theory and Clinical Reality in 
Drug Refusal by Psychiatric Patients, 7 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 306 (1979). 
46. See Scott v. Plante, 532 F.2d 939, 946 (3d Cir. 1976)(a mental patient properly 
committed still required due process adjudication of incompetency before he could be as­
sumed incapable of giving informed consent to drug treatment). Boyd v. Board of Regis­
trars of Voters of Belchertown, 368 Mass. 631, 334 N.E.2d 629 (1975)(mentally retarded 
persons voluntarily residing at public medical institution but never adjudged incompetent 
could not be precluded from registering to vote). 
47. See Rennie v. Klein, 476 F. Supp. 1294 (D. N.J. 1979), rev'd in part, affd in part 
and rem'd, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981), vac. and rem'd, 458 U.S. 1119 (1983). 
48. State v. Maryott, 6 Wash. App. at 102,492 P.2d at 243 (citing State v. Gwaltney, 
77 Wash. 2d 906, 468 P.2d 433 (1970); See also In re Dennis, 51 Cal. 2d 666,335 P.2d 657 
(1959). 
49. State v. Maryott, 6 Wash. App. at 102-03, 492 P.2d at 242-43. 
50. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
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cal behavior. In Louraine's case, expert testimony confirmed that he 
suffered hallucinations and violent episodes, often directed at himself, 
during the acute phases of his illness. 51 Sensitive to the potential for 
disruptive behavior when a defendant is unmedicated, the Vermont 
court in In re Pray cautioned that exposing the jury to an undrugged, 
unsedated defendant was permissible only if it was safe and did not 
impede the trial's progress. 52 In Illinois v. AlIen53 the Supreme Court 
held that a defendant's fundamental right under the sixth amendment 
to be present at trial may be limited or lost when his/her conduct 
makes an orderly trial impossible. 54 The means of control should be 
imposed with the least interference to defendants' rights. 55 If defend­
ants deliberately induces their own incompetency by choosing to be 
un medicated, they risk removal from the courtroom if they become 
disruptive. The ironic twist for mentally ill defendants, therefore, is 
that in the attempt to present a full defense by refusing medication 
they may suffer psychotic symptoms which if disruptive will result in 
their total exclusion from the court proceedings. 
B. The Dilemma of the Louraine Decision; Is There a Solution? 
Historically, the issues raised by the insanity defense are often 
complex and often controversial. The holding in Louraine presents 
additional considerations for a criminal defense attorney who must ad­
vise a client of the best defense strategy. Since psychotic disorders 
affect mental functioning communication with a mentally ill defendant 
may be difficult. Additionally, because antipsychotics are relatively 
new to the scientific field it can not be predicted how a defendant will 
behave with or without medication. 56 Furthermore, the legal field is 
not consistent in its approach to the subject and often reflects a myriad 
of judicial as well as medical opinions. 57 From the legal perspective, 
51. Louraine, 390 Mass. at 31, 453 N.E.2d at 440. See supra note 9. 
52. See supra note 29. 
53. 397 U.S. 337 (1970). 
54. Id. at 347. 
55. See Maryott, 6 Wash. App at 104, 492 P.2d at 243-44. 
56. Antipsychotic drugs belong to several classes of chemical compounds; the phe­
nothiazenes (thorazine (chorpromazine), prolixin (thephenazene», navane (thithexene» 
and butyrophenones (haldol (halopendox». They were first used to treat mental disorders 
(particularly schizophrenia) in the 1950's. See COLE, PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY IN THE 
PRACTICE OF MEDICINE (1977). 
57. Rennie v. Klein, 476 F. Supp. 1294 (D.N.J. 1979), rev'd in part. affd in part and 
rem'd, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981), vac. and rem'd, 458 U.S. 1119 (1983). See generally 
Comment, Judicial Schizophrenia: An Involuntrarily Confined Mental Patient's Right to Re­
fuse Antipsychotic Drugs, 51 UMKC L. REV. 74 (1982); Comment, The Scope of the Invol­
untarily Committed Mental Patient's Right to Refuse Treatment with Psychotropic Drugs: 
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the first cases dealing with the rights of the mentally ill involved the 
right to treatment58 and the due process procedures necessary to eval­
uate competence. 59 
The recent cases of Rennie v. Klein 60 in New Jersey, Mills v. Rog­
ers61 and In re Roe 62 in Massachusetts stand as landmark cases on the 
right of the mentally ill patient to be unmedicated. Though the focus 
of these cases is on the patient in a hospital setting, they are reflective 
of the courts' trend to extend protections which relate to the unique 
needs of the mentally ill. Massachusetts courts have applied both sub­
stantive and procedural constitutional analysis to cases litigating the 
right to refuse antipsychotic medication.63 
In Mills v. Rogers64 the supreme judicial court recognized a con­
stitutional right to refuse antipsychotic medication. In addition to de­
fining the substantive right, the court applied the doctrine of 
substituted judgment to the promulgated procedural safeguards.65 
Following the substituted judgment reasoning, which gives the pa­
tient's choice priority, the Louraine court acknowledged the defend­
ant's right to choose to be unmedicated at trial. 66 Barring an 
An Analysis of the Least Restrictive Alternative Doctrine, 28 VILL. L. REV. 101 (1982); 
Appelbaum, Gutheil, Rotting with Their Rights On; Constitutional Theory and Clinical Re­
ality in Drug Refusal by Psychiatric Patients, 7 Bull. Am. Acad. Psychiarty & L. 306 (1979); 
Gutheil, Appelbaum Mind Control. Synthetic Sanity. ArtifiCial Competence and Genuine 
Confusion; Legally Relevant Effects ofAntipsychotic Medication. 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 77 
(1983). 
58. See. e.g. Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974), vac. and rem'd on 
other grounds. 422 U.S. 563 (1975). on remand, 519 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1975), vacated sub 
nom. Gumanis v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 1052, rehearing denied, 423 U.S. 885 (1975). 
59. See. e.g., Scott v. Plante, 532 F.2d 939, 946 (3d Cir. 1976). 
60. Rennie, 476 F. Supp. 1294 (O.N.J. 1979), rev'd in part. ajf'd in part and rem'd, 
653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981), vac and rem'd, 458 U.S. 1119 (1983). 
61. Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), ajf'd in part. rev'd in part 634 
F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), vac. and rem'd sub nom. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982). 
62. In re Roe, 383 Mass. 415, 421 N.E.2d 40 (1981). 
63. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1981). See also Superintendent of Belchertown v. 
Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977)(incompetent mentally ill patient has a 
right to refuse life prolonging treatment). See infra note 63. 
64. Mills, 457 U.S. at 2442. 
65. Id. The substituted judgment standard had its origin over 150 years ago in the 
area of administration of the estate of incompetents. Ex parte Whitbread in re Hinde, a 
Lunatic, 35 Eng. Rep. 878 (1816). In modem times the doctrine has been used to decide 
cases where medical treatment is refused based on a determination that the incompetent 
would not have decided on treatment if he were competent to make the decision. It is 
important to ascertain if the person had any actual interests or preferences expressed when 
competent. Consideration of the medical effects, the effect on the family and the present 
and future incompetency of the individual would be factors entering into a decision making 
process of a competent person and therefore are relevant to substituted judgment decisions. 
66. Louraine, 390 Mass. at 32, 453 N.E.2d at 441. 
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emergency situation, therefore, the defendant has the responsibility of 
choice. If the defendant makes the decision to refuse medication be­
cause a natural demeanor is significant to his/her defense, the State 
should honor the choice. The Louraine court explicitly noted that it 
was not called upon to decide whether a court should forcibly medi­
cate the defendant to render himlher competent to stand trial. 67 If the 
supreme judicial court acknowledges the interest of both the mentally 
ill patient and defendant to decide whether to be medicated, however, 
then the substituted judgment approach would preclude a judge from 
deciding at a competency hearing what would be in the best interest of 
the defendant. 
At Peter Louraine's pretrial competency hearing, his lawyers did 
request that he be evaluated for trial in a drug free condition. The 
motion was denied. 68 The judge relied on the expert testimony which 
confirmed that Louraine would be incompetent to stand trial without 
medication.69 Although most medical specialists would argue that the 
best interests of the defendant are served by medication,70 from a legal 
perspective once the defendant makes the choice the court should eval­
uate hislher competency in the condition in which he appears at trial. 
If he/she is adjudged incompetent the Supreme Court has mandated 
that the State decide either to dismiss or follow civil commitment 
proceedings.71 
[A] person charged by a State with a criminal offense who has 
been committed solely on account of his incapacity to proceed to 
trial cannot be held more than the reasonable period of time neces­
sary to determine whether there is substantial probability that he 
will attain that capacity in the foreseeable future. If it is determined 
that this is not the case, then the State must either institute custom­
ary civil commitment proceeding that would be required to com it 
indefinitely any other citizen, or release the defendant. 72 
In February of 1983, Peter Louraine was to be tried again after 
his initial conviction was dismissed by the supreme judicial court due 
to sixth amendment violations.73 Louraine, however, never went to 
67. Id. at 38, 453 N.E.2d at 441. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. at 33, 453 N.E.2d at 441. 
70. See Appelbaum Gutheil, Rotting with Their Rights On: Constitutional Theory and 
Clinical Reality in Drug Refusal by Psychiatric Patients, 7 Bull. Am. Acad. Psychiarty & L. 
306 (1979). 
71. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972). 
72. Id. at 738. 
73. Telephone conversation with Attorney Lynda Thompson, attorney for Peter 
Louraine, on February 1984. 
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trial. Instead he chose to plead guilty to a lesser charge. He told the 
judge that if he exercised his right to be seen by the jury in his true 
demeanor he would never "make" it through trial. He knew without 
medication he had no hope of remaining sane.74 Louraine made his 
decision within the presently restrictive judicial parameters. It is clear' 
he was presented with a dilemma which the supreme judicial court 
decision did not assist in alleviating. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The right of the mentally ill to refuse antipsychotic medication 
has been a controversial subject, often hotly debated in the legal and 
medical communities. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts 
has been a pioneer in recognizing constitutional protections for the 
mentally ill in the hospital setting. The 1983 decision of Common­
wealth v. Louraine, analyzed under sixth amendment protections, now 
extends the right to refuse medication to the trial setting. 
The court's concern is to insure a fair trial. When criminal re­
sponsibility is at issue, therefore, all relevant evidence to the defense 
can be set before the jury. A defendant's demeanor at trial is a signifi­
cant factor when the insanity defense is raised. For this reason the 
State's forcible administration of antipsychotic medication impermissi­
bly interferred with Louraine's right to a fair trial. However, as Peter 
Louraine later concluded, refusing medication may result in the reoc­
currence of psychotic symptoms which may render him incompetent. 
The Louraine court gave little guidance for dealing with the compe­
tency issue but it did state approval for the New Hampshire court's 
approach when a defendant who chooses to be unmedicated is deemed 
to have waived hislher right to be competent at trial. Although the 
court has recognized the right to make a choice, the options available 
to defendants such as Louraine do not guarantee full sixth amendment 
protections. 
The Louraine decision, which uncontrovertably extends sixth 
amendment protections never before afforded to the mentally ill, when 
actually applied is limited its effect. Though the legal arguments 
averred by the supreme judicial court may appear valid, if the holding 
does not allow defendants all their constitutional protections, then in 
reality the protections created in Louraine are a delusion. 
Robin L. Oaks 
74. Id. 
